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Abstract
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is well known that the average wage exhibit great variation across countries.
Much of this variety can be explained by cross-country diﬀerences in produc-
tivity levels, however explaining the remainder requires further explanation.
Economists have considered this issue with ever greater sophistication. This
paper seeks to explain why workers receive a higher share of value added in
some countries than others. One explanation is that because some markets do
not clear completely, for whatever reason, rents are created. For example, some
professions such as medicine, law, or accountancy restrict entry to ensure high
standards. These restrictions may also create rents, since regulation will also
result in a degree of monopoly power. More generally, imperfect markets lead
to rents which are shared between the owners of capital and labour. How these
rents are shared depends on the bargaining strength of the diﬀerent parties,
and will lead to variations in the labour share. This paper is concerned with the
extent to which political factors can explain why workers in some countries are
able to extract more of the value added they create than in others. Speciﬁcally,
it investigates whether outcomes vary between democracies due to diﬀerences
in their constitutional arrangements. That is, do some democratic constitutions
engender labour market and societal institutions that cause the labour share of
income to be lower than in other democracies?
The analysis takes Rodrik (1999) as its starting point. He provides evidence
that "Democracies pay higher wages" conditional on income per capita. In
particular, he shows that the labour share of income is higher in democratic
countries than it is in others. However, even within the set of democracies there
is great variation. This paper will emphasize Lijphardt’s (1999) distinction
between the characteristics of what are termed "majoritarian" democracies and
"consensual" democracies.1
Why might wages be higher, relative to productivity, in one type of democ-
racy rather than another? Rodrik (1999) writes “...the data seem to suggest
that this paper’s central ﬁnding on the relationship between democracy and
wages is a consequence of political competition and political participation at
large...”(p24). Itwouldseemreasonabletosupposethatv ariationinconsti-
1Based upon an analysis of constitutional and electoral rules Lijphardt posits two
archetypal forms of representitive liberal Democracy. These are "Majoritarian" democracies
characterised by a presidential system and a majoritarian electoral system, and proportional or
"Consensual" democracies which generally have cabinet government, multi-member electoral
districts and an electoral system based upon proportional representation. This is discussed
in more detail in Chapter 2.
2tutional type could lead to variation in the degree and form of political compe-
tition. Several possible economic explanations of how this variation might lead
to diﬀerent wage levels present themselves. One explanation is that the eﬀec-
tiveness of lobbying in determining policy depends on the form of democracy,
an alternative is that it is due to diﬀerences constitutional rules altering the
incentives of politicians What these explanations share, however, is that they
assume competition is restricted in either product or labour markets and that
consequently there are potentially economic rents to be extracted.
The remainder of this paper will take the following form. The next sec-
tion considers in more detail why the form of constitution might be expected
to impact on the labour share of income. The third section will outline the
econometric approach, and in particular the use of Bayesian Model Averaging.
The fourth section discusses the data used for key variables, the ﬁfth section
presents the results and is followed by a brief conclusion.
2 Motivation
This section moots two reasons why it might be expected that the form of
democracy will aﬀect the labour share of income. The ﬁrst explanation is re-
lated to the large literature on lobbying and its eﬀects. Two diﬀerent but related
approaches are those of Lijphardt (1999) and Helpman and Persson (2001). Li-
jphardt suggests that consensual democracies are characterised by more formal
and institutionalised roles for lobbies, such as workers’ or employers’ groups. It
would be logical to expect that, on average, more powerful lobbies are more ef-
fective at altering labour market outcomes. Unfortunately, although Lijphardt
(1999) distinguishes between social corporatism, where labour movements have
more inﬂuence, and liberal corporatism, where business groups have more in-
ﬂuence, both are associated with consensual democracies. Hence, it is not
clear from his analysis whether consensual democracies should on average be
associated with a higher or lower labour share of value added.
An alternative, economic explanation of the role of interest groups might be
based on lobbying models such as that of Helpman and Persson (2001). They
suggest that, in parliamentary regimes, there will be no campaign contributions
by lobbyists and the governing coalition retains the rewards of oﬃce, whereas
in some cases outcomes in congressional regimes can be inﬂuenced by lobbying.
However, in the absence of any knowledge as to whom the lobbyists represent
3no prediction can be made. What is important is that both Lijphardt (1999)
and Helpman and Persson (2001) suggest that constitutional form will inﬂuence
lobbying outcomes. Clearly, the Lijphardt (1999) and Helpman and Persson
(2001) analyses consider diﬀerent sources of variation: the former is concerned
with the general features of consensual as opposed to majoritarian democracies;
the latter analyses the impact of speciﬁc features of the legislature, in particular
the presence of coalitions and stable agenda-setting powers in a parliamentary
democracy. But the relevant issue, in this context, is that in lobbying mod-
els the increased inﬂuence of interest groups, and more speciﬁcally workers’,
representatives could lead to workers eliciting more political favours, including
favourable legislation and consequently higher wages.
A second, although not necessarily contradictory, explanation is in the spirit
of Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000). They describe why parliamentary
(consensual) regimes would be expected to deliver more legislative cohesion.
T h i sc o u l di nt u r nl e a dt oas t a b l em a j o r i t yi ng o v e r n m e n tw h o s ec o n s t i t u e n t s
could be characterised as residual claimants.2 This majority might be seen as
likely to represent those who derive more of their income from labour than
capital (the "workers") as opposed to the smaller group whose income is largely
the returns from capital (the "capitalists"). Such residual claims might be
manifested in legislation designed to increase the return to labour.
This argument is in some ways similar to that of Grossman and Helpman
(2005). They present a model of majoritarian democracies in which the political
need for legislators to beneﬁt the voters in their district can lead to protectionist
trade policies. Of particular interest is that districts vary in their endowments
of diﬀerent factors of production, providing an incentive for the representative
of a particular district to favour particular goods when setting trade policy.
This analysis can be reinterpreted in terms of bargaining over labour legislation.
Grossman and Helpman model a three-district state in which the total ownership
of capital is the same in each district. If the assumption of equal wealth
were to be relaxed, and if capital ownership was assumed to be concentrated in
one district, then the representatives of the other two would have an electoral
incentive to try and legislate to increase the labour share. What is not analysed
in Grossman and Helpman’s (2005) model is what eﬀect a president would have
if conceived of as a veto player as in Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000). It is
suggested here that a president may veto legislation favouring particular groups
2The term residual claimants describes the notion that the majority are able to direct the
beneﬁts of power to themselves via their representatives.
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of workers if either it were not in their electoral interest, or perhaps because
they considered it not in the overall national interest.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between income per capita and data on
labour’s share of value added in manufacturing from the UNIDO (2005) data-
base. Perhaps most notable is the degree of variation in the labour share, from
around 10 percent to about 70 percent. It would also seem on casual inspection
that workers in richer democracies receive a larger share of income, and also but
less clearly that the labour share might be higher in parliamentary democracies.
This will be conﬁrmed by results obtained using Bayesian Modelling Averag-
ing approach where it will be found that presidential democracies are associated
with a labour share 12 percentage points lower than in equivalent parliamentary
regimes.
53M e t h o d o l o g y
This section will provide a brief overview of the econometric approach employed,
and how it provides for causal inference. Isolating the eﬀects of constitutions
from the potential determinants of the labour share is intrinsically complicated
by the interactions between market and state. The approach taken is to con-
ceive of the choice of constitution as a treatment, and to estimate the eﬀect
of that treatment. However, consistent estimation requires that the choice of
constitution must be independent of any other factor determining the labour
share. Formally, let Ym,Y c be the outcomes associated with a majoritarian
constitution or a consensual constitution respectively. X is the set of variables
which may partially determine the choice of constitution, and S ∈ {M,C} is
the choice of constitution.
It is unlikely that:
S q Ym,Y c (1)
But, it is potentially true that:
S q (Ym,Y c) | X (2)
As is standard, the relationship between the outcomes Y and the treatment
S can be written as follows:
Y =( 1− S)Yc + SYm = Yc + S(Ym − Yc) (3)
If estimates of (3) using OLS are to be unbiased then (2) must hold and
as such it is necessary to include the confounding variables X, whilst Yc is
subsumed into the constant term which is denoted α. Then by including a
binary variable, S, to denote whether or not a particular country has received
the treatment (in this case a majoritarian constitution) the associated coeﬃcient
β is an estimate of the treatment eﬀect. Such an OLS model can be written as
follows:
Y = α + βS + γX + ε (4)
such that:
6E(ε)=0 ,E(εS)=E( X)=0 ,E(  | S)=0 (5)
For estimation to be consistent both (2) and (5) must be true. This requires
that there are no relevant variables missing from X, and that those variables
included are uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. exogenous.
The reasons why diﬀerent nations have chosen diﬀerent constitutional rules
are complex and varied. As discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and
Acemoglu (2005) intellectual fashion and also potential colonial inﬂuence have
been of particular importance. But there are many other possible explanations
and the number of variables required to describe these competing explanations
is large. Given the small sample available, this prohibits including them all
in a regression analysis and hence leads to concerns about model uncertainty
since it is not known ap r i o r iwhat are the constituents of X. Many traditional
econometric approaches to this problem, such as stepwise regression, suﬀer from
path-dependence, that is they are sensitive to the order in which variables are
included. Moreover identifying the constituents of X via any attempt to test
down to a parsimonious speciﬁcation from a large set of variables will lead
to the inferential problems associated with data-mining as detailed by Miller
(2002, ch.6). In contrast, a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach may
be preferable since it will provide an estimate of the likelihood of diﬀerent choices
of X and also a posterior distribution for β obtained from each of the diﬀerent
possible models weighted by their respective posterior model probabilities.
The remainder of this section will provide a brief overview of BMA which
is described in more detail in Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, and Volinsky (1999)
and Malik and Temple (2006). BMA is premised on the basis that since, there
are sometimes multiple similarly likely statistical models which imply diﬀerent
inferences, it is sometimes helpful to consider a wide range of possible models,
and the overall likelihood of a variable being important. A BMA analysis
starts with a set of prior beliefs about which models are expected to be more
likely, and prior beliefs about the distribution of the coeﬃcients on particular
variables. For example, if one had a strong theoretical justiﬁcation for believing,
or previous results suggested, that a certain variable was likely to be statistically
important then models which included that variable could be given a higher prior
probability. Similarly, if it was believed that this variable was very likely to be
negatively associated with the dependent variable then its prior distribution
could be chosen such that the majority of the probability mass was where the
7coeﬃcient was negative. In the analysis here, few assumptions are made as
to the prior distribution. Instead what is termed a "diﬀuse" prior is used: in
particular it is assumed that every possible model has an equal prior probability,
that is if there are 225 possible models then each model has a prior probability
of 1
225. This assumption implies that every variable is assumed to have an equal
chance of 0.5 of inclusion in any given model. The prior distributions of the
coeﬃcients associated with each variable are chosen to have zero mean, and
variance proportional to the sample variance of the explanatory variable.
Given these choices, the posterior model distribution (the probability of
each model given the data) is calculated. Following Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery
and Volinsky (1999) let ∆ be the quantity of interest, such as the eﬀect of a
majoritarian constitution, and D the dataset. There are N =2 K possible
models Mk where K is the number of explanatory variables. The posterior
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pr(D | θk,M k)pr(θk | Mk)dθk (8)
The vector θk represents the parameters for model k, i.e. θk = {αk,β1,...,βK,σk}.
The exact interpretation of (6), (7), and (8) are discussed more thoroughly in
Kass and Raftery (1995), Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997), and Hoeting,
Madigan, Raftery, and Volinsky (1999). In essence (8) describes the chance of
observing the data if that particular model was the model believed before the
data were observed. The posterior probability of a particular model given by (7)
describes the probability of that model once the data have been observed and
(6) describes the calculation of the distribution of ∆, that is the the probability
of ∆ taking a given value for each model multiplied by the posterior probability
of that model.
Once the posterior model probability (PMP) of each model has been cal-
8culated, several related quantities can be obtained. The posterior inclusion
probability (PIP) is the sum of the PMPs of those models which include that
variable (i.e. those in which its coeﬃcient is non-zero). Also, the posterior
mean and standard deviation of a given variable can be calculated by comput-
ing the weighted average of the mean or standard deviation across all models
weighting by the PMPs.
4D a t a
This section will discuss the data used to measure the labour share, the type of
democracy, and the set of candidate control variables. Following Rodrik (1999)
the labour share in value added in manufacturing is used as the measure of
the labour share. As in Rodrik (1999) the data are taken from the UNIDO
Industrial Statistics database. The Labour share was calculated as average
labour costs divided by the mean value added per worker, and a ﬁve year average
was then created. The only diﬀerence with Rodrik’s approach is that the data
were calculated for each year in the period 1990-94; this period represented the
years for which there was greatest data availability and corresponds to the data
used by Persson and Tabellini which is also for the early 1990s. Further details
are contained in Appendix A. There has been some criticism of the use of factor-
share data. In particular Gollin (2002) claims that previous work using data
on factor shares overstates the variation between countries, as a consequence of
failing to take into account the income of entrepreneurs and more generally the
self-employed. However, these criticisms seem less applicable to manufacturing
industry data which is used for this reason and because it is available for a large
set of democracies.
Persson and Tabellini (2003) deﬁne six variables that describe diﬀerent as-
pects of constitutional type. These variables all measure aspects of the diﬀer-
ences between consensual and majoritarian democracies. The ﬁrst, pres, is a
dummy variable which takes a value of one if the executive is not accountable
to the legislature via no-conﬁdence votes. This measure corresponds to the dis-
tinction between congressional and parliamentary regimes discussed by Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini (1997). Pind describes the proportion of the legislature
not elected on the basis of party lists. In bicameral democracies it refers to
elections to the lower house. Magn is the “inverse of district magnitude”, the
9number of electoral districts per seat in the lower chamber. Sdm is analogous
to magn, but where there are electoral districts of diﬀerent sizes it calculates
the inverse of district magnitude as the weighted average of the diﬀerent district
sizes, where the weighting for each district size is the percentage of seats in the
legislature elected from districts of that size. Spropn describes the proportion of
electoral seats elected from national electoral districts rather than sub-national
districts. In this respect it captures something akin to pind.T h e ﬁnal variable
is maj which takes a value of one if elections to the lower-house of the legislature
a r eb yp l u r a l i t y( ﬁrst-past-the-post) rule, or zero otherwise.
Since the (latent) variable of interest is the degree of majoritarianism rather
than speciﬁc constitutional characteristics, a principal components analysis was
used to create variables describing the dimensions in which constitution type
varies. An analysis of the loadings of the principal components suggests that
the ﬁrst broadly measures majoritarianism.3
The ﬁve principal components will be denoted by g1,g 2, ... , g5. Two
of the other controls merit discussion as they are not predetermined. Income
per capita, denoted logyl is included because Rodrik ﬁnds it to be a signiﬁcant
determinant of the labour share. logyl is not predetermined and is partly
determined by the choice of constitution and the pre-treatment control variables
that generate constitutional selection. If constitutional choice partly determines
income per capita and this has an eﬀect on the labour share, then there will be
an indirect eﬀect of constitutional choice on the labour share due to its eﬀects
on income levels. In this case, to maintain the assumption that the coeﬃcients
on the constitutional variables identify a causal treatment eﬀe c ti ti sr e q u i r e d
that logyl is independent of the error term conditional on X (the predetermined
controls), that is, logyl qε | X. Following Lee (2005, ch.2) then the inclusion
of logyl as a candidate independent variable will mean that the indirect eﬀects
on the labour share of constitutional choice through logyl will be partialled out.
Therefore, the coeﬃcients associated with the treatment (constitutional choice)
will describe solely the direct eﬀects of the treatment, which is the quantity of
interest.
Similarly, if constitution type matters in explaining variation in the labour
share then it could be expected that the eﬀect would be greater in better func-
3The ﬁrst principal component explains 70% of the total variance and positively weights
all of the constitutional variables except spropn which has a very small negative value. The
second principal component acounts for a further 20% of the variance and places most weight
on spropn.
10tioning democracies. Hence, a measure of the quality of democracy is included.
PT use polityiv which is a measure of current democratic quality.4 It is sus-
pected that the quality of democracy is to a large extent determined by variables
not included in the set of candidate controls. For example, Dulleck and Frijters
(2004) and Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) suggest that a large natural resource
sector is associated with a failure to democratise.5 Hence, it is not plausible
to make the same assumption about the conditional exogeneity of polityiv as it
is for logyl, and therefore an instrument is needed. The instrumental variable
partitioned is from the data created by Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2006)
in which they investigate the extent to which states are often "artiﬁcial", cre-
ated by previous colonialists rather than representing underlying ethnic groups.
Partitioned describes the proportion of a state’s population who are members
of an ethnic group which is present in one or more adjacent countries. They
ﬁnd that partitioned is correlated with measures of political success. Using both
OLS and BMA analysis, partitioned is found to be a good predictor of polityiv
and is considered plausibly exogenous.6
Persson and Tabellini use the Hall and Jones (1999) data on latitude but
these data are unavailable for many Eastern European nations and consequently
data from the datasets accompanying Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) were
4Polityiv comes from the Polity IV project and is deﬁned as the democracy score minus
the autocracy score and varies between 10 (very democratic) and -10 (very autocratic). All
countries in the sample have a score of zero or above following PT’s deﬁnition of a democracy.
5Dulleck and Frijters (2004) propose a model in which elites in resource-rich countries
have little incentive to develop a modern sector from which they can extract limited rents
when they can extract large rents from “old sectors”. This is supported by Jensen and
Wantchekon (2004) who show that there is evidence to suggest that democratic transition
and consolidation in Africa is hampered by a large natural resource sector. Acemoglu (2005)
shows that in autocratic states, an elite may prefer ineﬃcient institutions if they provide
for greater rent extraction. The literature on democratic transitions, is also relevant. This
includes the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) who demonstrate that Western elites only
extended the franchise when the threat of revolution was credible and limited redistribution
could no longer sustain their rule. Similarly Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) present a model
in which elites are forced to pick between full democratisation and repression, as a limited
extension of the franchise or other concessions would be increase the demands of the majority
since they would perceive the elite as being weak. The counterfactual case is described by
Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) in which elites are modelled as sustaining their rule
by a process of “divide and rule”. When these models are considered in concert with the
evidence concerning natural resource extraction it is clear that there is ample evidence that
democracy is commonly not in the interests of the ruling elite, and moreover that it is possible
to conceive of natural resources as increasing the incentives for the elite to cling on to power,
and their ability to do so.
6They also compile another new variable fractal which measures the extent to which a
countries borders are straight, premised on the basis that states created by treaty or external
i n t e r f e r e n c ea r em o r el i k e l yt oh a v es t r a i g h t borders and those that are the product of an
evolutionary process to have complex-shaped borders. Unfortunately, fractal is not a good
predictor of polityiv.
11also used. 7 The data are not identical for those observations for which data
were available from both sources, due to slight diﬀerences in deﬁnition. Con-
sequently, a new variable using both datasets was created using multiple impu-
tation, denoted iLat01 which describes distance from the equator.
The other candidate control variables are largely from Persson and Tabellini
(2003). Engfrac describes the proportion of the population speaking English
as a ﬁrst language, Eurfrac is the same but for the major European languages
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. engfrac and eurfrac are in-
cluded based upon the work of Hall and Jones (1999) and, to a lesser extent,
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). The variables con2150,c o n 5180,
con81 are indicator variables which describe whether the current constitution
was promulgated between 1921 and 1950, 1951-1980 or post-1981 with 1920 or
earlier the omitted category. The inclusion of these variables is designed to rep-
resent the well-documented notion of diﬀerent waves of democratization. These
waves coincided with systematic variations in what constitutions were chosen,
as discussed in more detail in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Rockey (2007).
The variables age and demage describe how long a country has been a democ-
racy. demage is deﬁned by the start of a continuous set of positive Polity values
excluding any interruptions due to foreign occupation. The Polity variable
records the diﬀerence between the score given by the Polity IV database for the
extent of institutionalised autocracy and the degree of institutionalised democ-
racy with a score between of —10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic).
age is deﬁned as 2000-demage. Also included are the variables, proposed by
Rockey (2007): mthconstit and mthelect which are new measures of when a
country ﬁrst promulgated a democratic constitution, and when it held its ﬁrst
democratic election respectively. These variables are argued to represent a
useful alternative to age. They were compiled by applying two sets of objec-
tive criteria to the development of democracy in each country in Persson and
Tabellini’s (2003) dataset. These criteria and are designed to better capture the
variety in the democratisation experience of diﬀerent countries. logyl denotes
log income per capita. Finally indicator variables are included for whether a
country has a federal government (federal) or was colonized by the UK, Spain,
or another European nation discounted by time since independence (coluka,
colespa, colotha)a n dﬁnally which continent it is part of (africa, asiae, laam).
Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1.
7In particular Belarus; Czech Republic; Estonia; Latvia; Russia; Slovakia; and the Ukraine.
125R e s u l t s
This section will be organised as follows. Firstly, it will discuss the results and
implications of a benchmark speciﬁcation presented in Table 2. Then the results
of the same analysis but using partitioned in place of polityiv are considered
in Table 3. The second part of this section will analyse the implications of
some robustness tests using a Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MC3) estimation
approach that simultaneously performs BMA and the identiﬁcation of outliers,
the results of which are presented in Table 3. Some other robustness tests of
the assumptions in section 3 are also discussed brieﬂy.
The results from a benchmark speciﬁcation in Table 2 show that pres has
aP I Po f99.7%. This implies that pres is included in almost every likely
model. The posterior mean associated with pres is −0.12 which implies that
workers in countries with a presidential system receive a share of value added
12 percentage points less than their counterparts in parliamentary democracies.
This is especially striking given the small range of values of mean9094 which has
a standard deviation of only 0.14. However, none of the other constitutional
variables had high PIPs. This is perhaps surprising, but suggests that the
dimension of variation that is important is the presence (or not) of a presidential
system.
There are several possible explanations. One is that the greater separation
of powers in presidential systems means that any legislative majority is less able
to act as residual claimants and that policies favouring workers are more likely
to be enacted. Alternatively, perhaps the explanation is that presidencies are
less likely to have institutionalized lobby groups or are less responsive to them.
Table 2 also conﬁrms the Rodrik (1999) ﬁnding that income per capita is
a similarly important determinant of the labour share, with richer countries
paying their workers a greater share of output. The African continent dummy,
and the predicted share of trade in national income (frankrom)a l s oh a v eP I P s
of over 90%. Why African countries and countries likely to trade more than
average should be expected to have a higher labour share is not clear and is
not analysed in detail here. Three measures of the age of democracy have
intermediate PIPs (con2150,c o n 81, and mthconst) which poses the question
of whether they sometimes substitute for each other. However, inspection of
a chart (not reported) displaying the composition of each model shows that
if anything they tend to enter models together. Furthermore, the results are
robust to the exclusion of all of the age-of-democracy variables from the analysis.
13Table 3 reports BMA results using partitioned rather than polityiv among
the candidates for controls. The main results are robust to this change: Pres
has a high PIP of 98.7% while partitioned has a large PIP of 89.4%.A l s o t h e
importance of some other covariates increases dramatically, notably con2150,
mthconst, and federal. A smaller sample is available for partitioned as it cannot
be calculated for islands. To ensure that this high PIP for partitioned was not
a consequence of the smaller sample available, the benchmark speciﬁcation was
re-estimated using only those observations for which data on partitioned are
available. The results (not reported here) show that where N is only 44 as
opposed to 61, the PIP of polityiv remains almost zero whilst the PIPs of pres
and logyl remain above 90 percent.8
Outliers are a problem that can aﬀect cross-country analyses, as discussed
by Temple (1998). In the context of BMA standard post-estimation methods
of outlier identiﬁcation, such as DFITS, are not compatible with the Bayesian
approach. Instead, the two-stage estimation method combining outlier detec-
tion and BMA proposed by Hoeting, Raftery, and Madigan (1996) will be used.
First, possible outliers are identiﬁed by the robust estimator Least Trimmed
Squares (LTS) as developed by Rousseeuw (1984). Secondly, a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm is used to estimate the posterior distribution
of models. However, unlike the earlier BMA analysis it estimates (6) and si-
multaneously the posterior distribution of the outliers identiﬁed by the LTS
estimation. Further details are contained in Appendix A. The results of this
estimation method are contained in Table 4. The results conﬁrm that pres has
a PIP of nearly 100%, but also suggest Honduras and Ireland are outliers with
75% and 79% probability respectively. This method was repeated for the model
containing partitioned as reported in Table 5. The results suggest that the al-
ternative model is also outlier robust, with a reported PIP of over 99 percent
for pres and a similar set of likely control variables.
A variety of other robustness tests were also performed. The results are as
expected given the close to zero PIP of the constitutional variables other than
pres. Tests included using the original variables describing constitutional form
rather than those derived from the principal components analysis, using binary
variable versions of the principal components, principal components derived
from subsets of the constitutional variables, using fractal rather than partitioned,
and including a wide range of interaction terms involving age, polityiv, and the
8There are 44 not 45 observations for which there are data on polityiv and partitioned.
This is because there are data on partitioned but not polityiv for Belize.
14constitutional variables.
OLS estimates of the most likely models identiﬁed in the BMA and MC3
analyses with Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in Table 6.
Again pres has an estimated coeﬃcient of around −0.12 and is signiﬁcant at the
1% level. However, some caution is necessary when interpreting these results,
since when estimating a model identiﬁed through extensive model selection,
conventional t-ratios are generally biased away from zero. But, taken as a
whole the BMA, MC3 and OLS results all point in the same direction: presi-
dential democracies pay signiﬁcantly lower wages. Moreover, since BMA helps
to circumvent traditional issues concerning model uncertainty, there is little to
suggest that the main ﬁnding is not unusually robust.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper was motivated by a simple question. If, as Rodrik (1999) claims,
‘democracies pay higher wages’, why do workers in some democracies receive a
larger share of value-added than others? In particular, this paper has argued
that diﬀerent constitutional rules may alter the relative balance of power in wage
negotiations. The results provide support for one of the hypotheses discussed
in the introduction: that a president may veto legislation designed to beneﬁt
workers. All of the estimates obtained suggest that, on average, a Presidential
system is associated with a labour share 12 percentage points lower than in
parliamentary democracies. This is almost one standard deviation across coun-
tries, and given the robustness of the methodology used, the ﬁndings suggest
that constitutions aﬀect labour market outcomes in a quantitatively important
as well as statistically signiﬁcant way.
This empirical evidence is interesting in itself, and suggests that it would be
desirable to develop a formal theoretical analysis of the political economics of the
wage bargaining process. This task is far from trivial, due to the myriad factors
that combine to inﬂuence both the political process and the labour market, but
an obvious point of departure might be the work of Grossman and Helpman
(2006) and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000).
This paper used the labour share in manufacturing as the dependent variable.
Further empirical work might consider the inﬂuence of constitutions on the
aggregate labour share. Drawing on the work of Gollin (2002), the role of the
self-employed could be investigated. This also raises the question of whether
15regimes that engender a higher labour share simultaneously reduce the returns
to self-employment.
7 Appendix A: Data and Computation
The Factor Share Data
Data on labour shares were downloaded from on the 9th of January 2006
from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), In-
dustrial Statistics Database 2005 at the 3-digit level of ISIC Code (Revision
2), from ESDS International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester. Data was
unavailable for the following countries described by PT’s dataset: Czech Re-
public, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Guatemala, Latvia, Nicaragua, Papua
New Guinea, Portugal, St Vincent & Grenadines, Switzerland, Uganda, and
the Ukraine. Also, the data for Germany are data for West-Germany for 1990-
’92. The calculated labour share of output is 0.62 for the entirety of Germany
for the period 1998-2000 and 0.42 for Western Germany for the period 1990-’92.
The data for West Germany is chosen premised on the idea that the eﬀects of
the form of democracy should only impact upon the democratic part of Ger-
many. The averages are based upon only one observation for Gambia, Namibia,
and Paraguay, but the results are robust to their (and Germany’s) omission.
Computational Methods
The BMA was performed using code written in ‘R’ the GNU version of
S+. The particular package used, bicreg, was Ian S. Painter’s translation from
the S+ code by Adrian Raftery and revised by Chris Volinsky. The MC3
estimates were arrived at using Ian S. Painter’s translation of Jennifer Hoeting’s
S+ code. More precisely, the BMA estimates were obtained considering all
models that at most were 100 times less likely than the model identiﬁed as
most likely. The hyperparameters used for the MC3 estimation were those
recommended in Hoeting, Madigan, and Raftery (1996). In particular the prior
probability that an observation was an outlier was set as 0.02 for the estimates
involving polityiv and not partitioned and 0.1 for the dataset using partitioned
where there are fewer than 50 observations. The number of iterations used was
50,000 but the results were checked for stability up to 1,000,000 iterations for









Dev  Min  Max  Definition  Source 
Dependent Variable




pres  85 0.39  0.49 0.00 1.00 Equals 1 if Presidential regime, 
0 otherwise. 
PT 




spropn  76 0.13  0.25 0.00 1.00 Proportion of legislators elected 
from national electoral districts. 
PT 
magn  83 0.47  0.40 0.01 1.00 Inverse of district magnitude.  PT 
pind  83 0.44  0.47 0.00 1.00 Proportion of lower house not 
elected using party lists. 
PT 









g2  75 0.00  1.02 ‐0.68 4.14 2
nd principle component  PCA 
g3  75 0.00  0.50 ‐1.51 1.36 3
rd principle component  PCA 
g4  75 0.00  0.34 ‐0.95 1.22 4
th principle component  PCA 
g5  75 0.00  0.19 ‐0.70 0.34 5
th principle component  PCA 




logyl  84 9.18  0.88 6.95 10.48 Natural log of income per capita 
measured in 1988 
PT 









engfrac  78 0.14  0.32 0.00 1.00 Percentage of population who 
speak English natively 
PT 
































mthconst  85 0.54  0.57 0.04 2.58 Date when democratic 
constitution was promulgated 
CH3 









africa  85 0.13  0.34 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
country is in Africa, 0 otherwise 
PT 





















PT indicates that the data are taken from the database accompanying Persson and Tabellini (2003, 
2004). UNIDO indicates that the data are from the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), Industrial Statistics Database 2005 at the 3-digit level of ISIC Code 
(Revision 2), downloaded from ESDS International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester.  CH3 
indicates that the variable was created according to the criteria discussed in Chapter 3, MI indicates 
that the variable was constructed using multiple imputation as described in the data appendix, PCA 
indicates that the variables are constructed on the basis of a principal components analysis, all other 




























Intercept  100.0 ‐ 0.438 0.194 ‐0.502 ‐ 0.480 ‐0.490 ‐ 0.386 ‐ 0.413 
pres  99.6 ‐ 0.114 0.030 ‐0.117 ‐ 0.113 ‐0.114 ‐ 0.117 ‐ 0.100 
logyl  99.2  0.078 0.021 0.084  0.083 0.083  0.069  0.070 
africa  90.9  0.103 0.052 0.114  0.107 0.121  0.107  0.109 
frankrom  90.7  0.037 0.019 0.042  0.044 0.040  0.043  0.040 
con5180  32.0 ‐ 0.015 0.026 ‐0.046
con2150  27.9  0.016 0.031 0.054 
mthconst  18.9  0.007 0.019 0.033 
engfrac  16.7 ‐ 0.011 0.031
ilat01  9.1  0.012 0.046 0.116 
g5  5.6  0.003 0.019
coluka  4.6  0.002 0.015
federal  4.5 ‐ 0.002 0.013
eurfrac  4.4 ‐ 0.001 0.009
laam  3.9 ‐ 0.002 0.013
g4  2.2  0.000 0.006
g2  2.0  0.000 0.002
age  0.7 ‐ 0.001 0.009
g1  0.0  0.000 0.000
g3  0.0  0.000 0.000
polityiv  0.0  0.000 0.000
mthelect  0.0  0.000 0.000
asiae  0.0  0.000 0.000
N  61 
R
2  0.616  0.637 0.633  0.629  0.628 
BIC ‐ 41.95 ‐ 41.26 ‐40.55 ‐ 39.88 ‐ 39.81 
The dependent variable is the mean of the labour share of value-added in manufacturing in the 
period 1990-1994.  The variables are sorted by their posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs): the 
sum of the posterior probabilities of those models which include that variable.   The posterior 
expected value is the weighted average of the expected value in each model, weighting using the 
Posterior Model Probability (PMP) of each model.  The posterior standard deviation is calculated 
using the same approach but using the standard deviations in each model.  Models 1-5 are the 5 
most likely models based assessed on their PMPs, and describe the variables included in those 
models and their coefficients.  The variables g1-g5 are derived from a principal components 



























Intercept  100.0 ‐ 0.233  0.345  ‐0.289 ‐ 0.183 ‐ 0.152 ‐ 0.279 ‐ 0.307 
africa  98.9  0.182  0.056  0.183  0.196  0.188  0.200  0.192 
pres  98.7 ‐ 0.120  0.038  ‐0.132 ‐ 0.116 ‐ 0.123 ‐ 0.100 ‐ 0.124 
partitioned  89.4 ‐ 0.001  0.001  ‐0.001 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.001 
logyl  87.7  0.059  0.035  0.069  0.060  0.057  0.060  0.071 




0.076  0.073  0.070  0.062  0.079 
federal  74.1 ‐ 0.071  0.054  ‐0.101 ‐ 0.109 ‐ 0.101 ‐ 0.077 ‐ 0.110 
g5  47.5  0.066  0.089  0.125  0.114 
frankrom  46.2  0.020  0.026  0.033 
con81  28.7  0.015  0.028  0.052  0.046 
asiae  15.5 ‐ 0.013  0.037 
g3  10.9 ‐ 0.008  0.028 
g2  5.7 ‐ 0.001  0.004 
laam  5.7  0.002  0.020 
coluka  5.5  0.003  0.016 
age  4.4 ‐ 0.004  0.027 
ilat01  3.9  0.000  0.035 
con5180  3.1 ‐ 0.001  0.008 
eurfrac  1.7  0.000  0.006 
g4  0.1  0.000  0.002 
g1  0.0  0.000  0.000 
N  45 
R2 
0.806 0.769 0.788  0.786 0.784
BIC 
‐39.503 ‐39.282 ‐39.256 ‐ 38.969 ‐38.423
The dependent variable is the mean of the labour share of value-added in manufacturing in the period 
1990-1994.  The variables are sorted by their posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs): the sum of the 
posterior probabilities of those models which include that variable.   The posterior expected value is the 
weighted average of the expected value in each model, weighting using the Posterior Model Probability 
(PMP) of each model.  The posterior standard deviation is calculated using the same approach but using 
the standard deviations in each model.  Models 1-5 are the 5 most likely models based assessed on their 
PMPs, and describe the variables included in those models and their coefficients.  The variables g1-g5 are 
derived from a principal components analysis of the five measures of constitutional type:- maj, magn, 





















pres  0.996           
logyl  0.993           
africa  0.939           
con2150  0.828          
con81  0.718          
mthconst  0.697          
Federal  0.633          
Coluka  0.432      
Frankrom  0.356   


















Ireland  0.799          













0.050  0.028  0.028  0.014  0.013 




















logyl  0.996                
pres  0.993                
africa  0.993                
con2150  0.889                
federal  0.817                
mthconst  0.790                
g5  0.497          
con81  0.442          
















Honduras  0.985                
Belgium  0.361          
Turkey  0.252       









0.050  0.028  0.028  0.014  0.013 
The dependent variable is the mean of the labour share of value-added in manufacturing in the 
period 1990-1994.  Estimates obtained using the MC
3 estimator.  The variables are sorted by their 
posterior inclusion probabilities (PIPs): the sum of the posterior probabilities of those models 
which include that variable.    Models 1-5 are the 5 most likely models based assessed on their 
PMPs, and describe the variables included, and observations identified as outliers, in those models.  
The variables g1-g5 are derived from a principal components analysis of the five measures of 




Dependent Variable: mean9094 – Average labour share of value‐ added in manufacturing 1990‐
1994 












































































N  69  47  69 46   
Nvars  4  7  8 7   
R
2  0.61  0.75  0.79 0.81   
Note: Estimation by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses where * indicates significance at 
the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
Constant term is included in each regression but not reported.  Column 1 reports OLS estimates of 
the model suggested as being most likely by the BMA analysis reported in table 2. Column 2 
reports OLS estimates of the model suggested as being most likely which does not include g5  by 
the BMA using partitioned reported in table 3.  Columns 3 and 4 report results based on the 
corresponding MC3 analyses.  
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